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Abstract 
A methodology to produce disaggregated estimates of inequality is implemented 
in three developing countries:  Ecuador, Madagascar, and Mozambique.  These inequality 
estimates are decomposed into progressively more disaggregated spatial units and the 
results in all three countries are suggestive that even at a very high level of spatial 
disaggregation, the contribution of within-community inequality to overall inequality 
remains very high.  The results also indicate there is a considerable amount of variation 
across communities in all three countries.  The basic correlates of local-level inequality 
are explored, and it is consistently found that geographic characteristics are strongly 
correlated with inequality, even after controlling for demographic and economic 
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1. Introduction 
The 1990s have witnessed a resurgence in theoretical and empirical attention by 
economists to the distribution of income and wealth.
1  One important strand of research 
in the area of political economy and public policy has focused on the appropriate level of 
government to which can be devolved financial and decisionmaking power regarding 
public service provisioning and financing.  The advantage of decentralization to make use 
of better community-level information about priorities and the characteristics of residents 
may be offset by a greater likelihood that the local governing body is controlled by 
elites￿to the detriment of weaker community members.  In a recent paper, Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (1999) highlight the roles of both the level and heterogeneity of local 
inequality as determinants of the relative likelihood of capture at different levels of 
government.  As most of the theoretical predictions are ambiguous, they stress the need 
for empirical research into the causes of political capture￿analysis that to date remains 
relatively scarce.
2  In addition to questions of political capture, decentralization also has 
the potential weakness that community level decisions may be less likely to reflect social 
and economic costs and benefits across larger spatial scales. 
Detailed information on local-level inequality has traditionally been available 
only from case studies that focus on one or two specific localities.
3  Such studies do not 
provide a basis for generalizations about local level inequality across large numbers of 
communities.  Construction of comprehensive ￿geographic profiles￿ of inequality across 
localities has been held back by limitations with conventional distributional data.  
                                                 
1 In their introductory chapter to the Handbook of Income Distribution, Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000) 
welcome the marked expansion of research on income distribution during the 1990s, but underscore that 
much ground remains to be covered. 
2 Although see Galasso and Ravallion (2002), Ravallion (1999, 2000), and Tendler (1997). 
3 Lanjouw and Stern (1998) report on a detailed analysis of the evolution of poverty and inequality in a 
north Indian village over five decades.  As their study covered the entire population of the village in all 
survey years, their measures of income inequality describe the true distribution of income in the village.  
Such studies are rare.  More common are village or community studies that estimate inequality across 
(often small) samples of households within the village. 2 
Detailed household surveys that include reasonable measures of income or consumption 
are samples, and thus are rarely representative or of sufficient size at low levels of 
disaggregation to yield statistically reliable estimates.  In the three developing countries 
examined here￿Ecuador, Madagascar, and Mozambique￿the lowest level of 
disaggregation possible using sample survey data is to regions that encompass hundreds 
of thousands of households.  At the same time, census (or large sample) data of sufficient 
size to allow disaggregation either have no information about income or consumption, or 
measure these variables poorly. 
This paper provides, in the next section, a brief description of a recently 
developed statistical procedure to combine data sources so as to take advantage of the 
detailed information available in household sample surveys and the comprehensive 
coverage of a census (Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw, 2002, 2003; Demombynes et al. 
2002; Hentschel et al. 2000).  Using a household survey to impute per capita 
expenditures, y, for each household enumerated in the census we estimate inequality at a 
finely disaggregated level.  The idea is straightforward.  First a model of y is estimated 
using the sample survey data, restricting explanatory variables to those either common to 
both survey and census, or variables in a tertiary data set that can be linked to both of 
those data sets.  Then, letting W represent an indicator of poverty or inequality, we 
estimate the expected level of W given the census-based observable characteristics of the 
population of interest using parameter estimates from the ￿first-stage￿ model of y.  The 
same approach could be used with other household measures of well being, such as 
assets, income, or employment. 
Applying this methodology to the three developing countries mentioned above, 
we examine how well our census-based estimates match estimates from the 
corresponding household surveys at the level of disaggregation at which the household 
surveys are representative.  Following a description of our data in Section 3, and a 
discussion of implementation of the method in Section 4, we find in Section 5 that despite 
the variation in levels of development, geographical context, quality, and organization of 
data, the method seems to work well in all three countries we examine. 3 
In Section 6 we turn to a detailed examination of local-level inequality in our 
three countries.  We first examine the importance of local-level inequality by 
decomposing national inequality in all three countries into a within-community and 
between-community component, where we successively redefine community to 
correspond to lower levels of disaggregation.  We find that in all countries, the within-
community share of overall inequality remains dominant even after we have 
disaggregated the country into a very large number of small communities (corresponding 
to the third administrative level￿often representing an average of no more than 1,000-
2,000 households).  These results might be construed to suggest that there is no basis for 
expecting communities to exhibit a greater degree of homogeneity than larger units of 
aggregation.  To the extent that local-level inequality is correlated with factors, such as 
elite-capture, that might threaten the success of local-level policy initiatives such as 
decentralization and community-driven development, this finding sends a cautioning note 
where initiatives in local-level decisionmaking are being explored. 
However, it is important to carefully probe these decomposition results.  
Decomposing inequality into a within-group and between-group component effectively 
produces a summary statistic that can mask important differences.  Upon closer 
examination of the distribution of communities in our data sets, we find that in all three 
countries considered, a very high percentage share of within-community inequality is 
perfectly consistent with a large majority of communities having levels of inequality well 
below the national level of inequality.  We illustrate how this seemingly paradoxical 
finding is in fact fully consistent with the decomposition procedure. 
Given that in our three countries we observe a significant degree of heterogeneity 
in inequality levels across communities, we explore in Section 7 some simple correlates.  
Our aim is not so much to explain local inequality (in a causal sense) but rather to explore 
the extent to which inequality is correlated with geographic characteristics, and whether 
this correlation survives the inclusion of some basic economic and demographic controls. 
In Section 8 we offer some concluding remarks. 
 4 
2.  An Overview of the Methodology 
The survey data are first used to estimate a prediction model for consumption and 
then the parameter estimates are applied to the census data to derive welfare statistics.  
Thus, a key assumption is that the models estimated from the survey data apply to census 
observations.  This is most reasonable if the survey and census years coincide.  In this 
case, simple checks can be carried out by comparing the estimates to basic poverty or 
inequality statistics in the sample data.  If different years are used but the assumption is 
considered reasonable, then the welfare estimates obtained refer to the census year, 
whose explanatory variables form the basis of the predicted expenditure distribution. 
An important feature of the approach applied here involves the explicit 
recognition that the poverty or inequality statistics estimated using a model of income or 
consumption are statistically imprecise.  Standard errors must be calculated.  The 
following subsections briefly summarize the discussion in Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw 
(2002, 2003).   
Definitions 
Per capita household expenditure, yh, is related to a set of observable 
characteristics, xh
4: 
 ln  yh = E[ln yh | xh ] + uh .  (1) 
Using a linear approximation, we model the observed log per capita expenditure for 
household h as 
  h h h u y + ′ = β x ln  ,  (2) 
where β is a vector of parameters and uh is a disturbance term satisfying 
                                                 
4 The explanatory variables are observed values and need to have the same degree of accuracy in addition 
to the same definitions across data sources. 5 
  E[uh | xh] = 0. 
In applications we allow for location effects and heteroskedasticity in the distribution of 
the disturbances. 
The model in equation (2) is estimated using the household survey data.  We are 
interested in using these estimates to calculate the welfare of an area or group for which 
we do not have any, or insufficient, expenditure information.  Although the 
disaggregation may be along any dimension￿not necessarily geographic￿we refer to 
our target population as a ￿county.￿  Household h has mh family members.  While the unit 
of observation for expenditure is the household, we are more often interested in welfare 
measures based on individuals.  Thus we write W (m, X, β, u), where m is a vector of 
household sizes, X is a matrix of observable characteristics, and u is a vector of 
disturbances.  Because the disturbances for households in the target population are 
always unknown, we estimate the expected value of the indicator, given the census 
households￿ observable characteristics and the model of expenditure in equation (2).
5  We 
denote this expectation as 
  µ = E[W | m, X, ξ ] ,  (3) 
where ξ is the vector of all model parameters, i.e., β and the parameters describing the 
distribution of u.  In constructing an estimator of µv we replace the unknown vector ξ 
with consistent estimators, ξ ￿ , from the first-stage expenditure regression.  This yields 
µ ￿  = E[W | m, X, ξ ￿ ]. 
This expectation is generally analytically intractable, so we use Monte Carlo simulation 
to obtain our estimator, µ ~ . 
                                                 
5 If the target population includes sample survey households, then some disturbances are known.  As a 
practical matter, we do not use these few pieces of direct information on y. 6 
Estimating Error Components 
The difference between µ ~ , our estimator of the expected value of W for the 
county and the actual level of welfare for the county may be written: 
  ) ~ ￿ ( ) ￿ ( ) ( ~ µ µ µ µ µ µ − + − + − = − W W . (4) 
Thus the prediction error has three components:  the first due to the presence of a 
disturbance term in the first-stage model, which implies that households￿ actual 
expenditures deviate from their expected values (idiosyncratic error); the second due to 
variance in the first-stage estimates of the parameters of the expenditure model (model 
error); and the third due to using an inexact method to compute µ ￿  (computation error).
6  
Idiosyncratic Error 
The variance in our estimator due to idiosyncratic error falls approximately 
proportionately in the number of households in the county.  That is, the smaller the target 
population, the greater is this component of the prediction error, and there is thus a 
practical limit to the degree of disaggregation possible.  At what population size this error 
becomes unacceptably large depends on the explanatory power of the expenditure model 
and, correspondingly, the importance of the remaining idiosyncratic component of the 
expenditure equation (2). 
Model Error 
The part of the variance due to model error is determined by the properties of the 
first-stage estimators.  Therefore it does not increase or fall systematically as the size of 
the target population changes.  Its magnitude depends on the precision of the first-stage 
coefficients and the sensitivity of the indicator to deviations in household expenditure.  
For a given county, its magnitude will also depend on the distance of the explanatory 
                                                 
6 Elbers et al. (2001) use a second survey in place of the census, which then also introduces sampling error. 7 
variables for households in that county from the levels of those variables in the sample 
data. 
Computation Error 
The variance in our estimator due to computation error depends on the method of 
computation used and can be made as small as desired by increasing the number of 
simulations. 
3.  Data 
In all three of the countries examined here, household survey data were combined 
with unit record census data; details of these data sources are summarized in Table 1.  In 
Ecuador the poverty map is based on census data from 1990, collected by the National 
Statistical Institute of Ecuador (Instituto Nacional de Estad￿stica y Censos, INEC) 
combined with household survey data from 1994.  The census covered roughly 2 million 
households.  The sample survey (Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida, ECV) is based on the 
Living Standards Measurement Surveys approach developed by the World Bank, and 
covers just under 4,500 households.  The survey provides detailed information on a wide 
range of topics, including food consumption, nonfood consumption, labor activities, 
agricultural practices, entrepreneurial activities, and access to services such as education 
and health.  The survey is clustered and stratified by the country￿s three main 
agroclimatic zones and a rural-urban breakdown.  It also oversamples Ecuador￿s two 
main cities, Quito and Guayaquil.  Hentschel and Lanjouw (1996) develop a household 
 
Table 1  Main data sources 
Survey Census 
Country  Year 
Sample size 





Ecuador 1994  4,391    1990  10.2  2.0 
Madagascar 1993-94  4,508   1993  11.9  2.4 
Mozambique 1996-97  8,250    1997  16.1  3.6 8 
consumption aggregate adjusted for spatial price variation using a Laspeyres food price 
index reflecting the consumption patterns of the poor.  The World Bank (1996) 
consumption poverty line of 45,476 sucres per person per fortnight (approximately $1.50 
per person per day) underlies the poverty numbers reported here.  Although the 1994 
ECV data were collected four years after the census, we maintain the assumption that the 
model of consumption in 1994 is appropriate for 1990.  The period 1990-94 was one of 
relative stability in Ecuador.  Comparative summary statistics on a selection of common 
variables from the two data sources support the presumption of little change over the 
period.  Additional details on these data may be found in Hentschel et al. (2000). 
Three data sources were used to produce local level poverty estimates for 
Madagascar:  first, the 1993 unit record population census data collected by the Direction 
de la DØmographie et Statistique Social (DDSS) of the Institut National de la Statistique 
(INSTAT).  Second, a household survey, the EnquŒte Permanente AuprŁs des MØnages 
(EPM), fielded to 4,508 households between May 1993 and April 1994, by the Direction 
des Statistique des MØnages (DSM) of INSTAT.  Third, a set of spatial and 
environmental outcomes at the Fivondrona level (second administrative level or 
￿districts￿) was used with the help of GIS.
7  The consumption aggregate underpinning the 
Madagascar poverty map includes components such as an imputed stream of 
consumption from the ownership of consumer durables.  Further details are provided in 
Mistiaen et al. (2002). 
The Mozambique survey data used in this analysis are from the InquØrito 
Nacional aos Agregados Familiares sobre as Condi￿ıes de Vida, 1996-7 (IAF96).  The 
survey is a multipurpose household and community survey following the World Bank￿s 
LSMS format and covering 8,250 households living throughout Mozambique.  The 
sample is designed to be nationally representative, as well as representative of each of the 
ten provinces, the city of Maputo, and along the rural/urban dimension.  As the survey 
was fielded over a period of 14 months, and there is significant temporal variation in food 
                                                 
7 These data were provided to this project by the nongovernmental organization CARE. 9 
prices corresponding to the agricultural season, nominal consumption values were 
deflated by a temporal price index.  Similarly, spatial differences in the cost of living 
were addressed by using a spatial deflator based on the cost of region-specific costs of 
basic needs poverty lines (Datt et al. 2000).  In this study, the IAF96 is paired with the II 
Recenseamento Geral de Popula￿ªo e Habita￿ªo (Second General Population and 
Housing Census) conducted in August 1997.  In addition to providing the first complete 
enumeration of the country￿s population since the initial post-independence census in 
1980, the 1997 census collected information on a range of socioeconomic variables.  
These include educational levels and employment characteristics of those older than six 
years, dwelling characteristics, and ownership of some consumer durables and productive 
assets.  The 1997 census covers approximately 16 million people living in 3.6 million 
households.  Further details on the Mozambique data can be found in Simler and Nhate 
(2002). 
4.  Implementation 
The first-stage estimation is carried out using the household sample survey.  For 
each of the three countries considered in this paper, the household survey is stratified into 
a number of regions and is representative at that level.  Within each region there are one 
or more levels of clustering.  At the final level, households are randomly selected from a 
census enumeration area.  Such groups we refer to as ￿cluster￿ and denote by a subscript 
c.  Expansion factors allow calculation of regional totals. 
Our first concern is to develop an accurate empirical model of household 
consumption.  Consider the following model: 




ch ch ch x u x y E y ε η + + = + = β ] | [ln ln , (5) 
where η and ε are independent of each other and uncorrelated with observable 
characteristics.  This specification allows for an intracluster correlation in the 
disturbances.  One expects location to be related to household income and consumption, 10 
and it is certainly plausible that some of the effect of location might remain unexplained 
even with a rich set of regressors.  For any given disturbance variance, 
2
ch σ , the greater 
the fraction due to the common component ηc, the less one benefits from aggregating 
over more households.  Welfare estimates become less precise.  Further, failing to 
account for spatial correlation in the disturbances could bias the inequality estimates. 
Thus the first goal is to explain the variation in consumption due to location as 
much as possible with the choice and construction of explanatory variables.  We tackle 
this in four ways. 
•  We estimate different models for different strata in the countries￿ respective 
surveys. 
•  We include in our specification household-level indicators of access to various 
networked infrastructure services, such as electricity, piped water, networked 
waste disposal, telephone, etc.  To the extent that all or most households within a 
given neighborhood or community are likely to enjoy similar levels of access to 
such networked infrastructure, these variables might capture unobserved location 
effects. 
•  We calculate means at the enumeration area (EA) level in the census (generally 
corresponding to the ￿cluster￿ in the household survey) of household-level 
variables, such as the average level of education of household heads.  We then 
merge these EA means into the household survey and consider them for inclusion 
in the first-stage regression specification.
8 
•  Finally, in the case of Madagascar, we have merged a Fivondrona-level data set 
provided by CARE and considered these spatially referenced environmental 
variables, such as droughts and cyclones, for inclusion in our household 
expenditure models.  The final models for Madagascar included Fivondrona-level 
                                                 
8 In Madagascar the EA in the household survey is not the same as that in the census.  The most detailed 
spatial level at which we can link the two data sets is the firaisana (￿commune￿).  Thus, firaisana-level 
means were used.   11 
GIS variables for flood risk and how many times the eye of a cyclone had passed 
over the Fivondrona. 
 
To select variables to reduce location effects, we regress the total residuals, u ￿ , on 
cluster fixed effects.  We then regress the cluster fixed-effect parameter estimates on our 
location variables and select a limited number that best explain the variation in the cluster 
fixed-effects estimates.
9  These location variables are then included in the first-stage 
regression model. 
A Hausman test described in Deaton (1997) is used to determine whether to 
estimate with household weights.  
2 R s for our models are generally high, ranging 
between 0.45 and 0.77 in Ecuador, 0.29 to 0.63 in Madagascar, and 0.27 to 0.55 in 
Mozambique.
10 
We next model the variance of the idiosyncratic part of the disturbance, 
2
,ch ε σ .  
The total first-stage residual can be decomposed into uncorrelated components as 
follows: 
  ch c c ch c ch e u u u u + = − + = η ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ . .  ,  (6) 
where a subscript ￿.￿ indicates an average over that index.  Thus the mean of the total 
residuals within a cluster serves as an estimate of that cluster￿s location effect.  To model 
heteroscedasticity in the household-specific part of the residual, we choose somewhere 
between 5 and 20 variables, zch, that best explain variation in 
2
ch e  out of all potential 
explanatory variables, their squares, and interactions.
11 
                                                 
9 As degrees of freedom with cluster-level variables are very limited, only the five or six location variables 
with the best explanatory power are usually selected. 
10 Again, see Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2002), Mistiaen et al. (2002), and Simler and Nhate (2002) 
for details. 
11 The zch variables are selected by a stepwise procedure using a bounded logistic functional form.  When 
this yields more than 20 variables, we limit the number of explanatory variables to be cautious about 
overfitting. 12 
Finally, we determine the distribution of η and ε using the cluster residuals  c η ￿  

















ε ε σ σ
∑ − = , 
respectively, where H is the number of households in the survey.  We use normal or t 
distributions with varying degrees of freedom (usually five), or the actual standardized 
residual distribution mentioned above when taking a semi-parametric approach.  Before 
proceeding to simulation, the estimated variance-covariance matrix is used to obtain final 
GLS estimates of the first-stage consumption model. 
At this point we have a full model of consumption that can be used to simulate 
any expected welfare measures with associated prediction errors.  For a description of 
different approaches to simulation, see Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw (2000). 
5.  Stratum-Level Comparisons Between Survey and Census 
In this section we examine the degree to which our census-based estimates match 
estimates from the countries￿ respective surveys at the level at which those surveys are 
representative.
12  Table 2 presents estimates for Ecuador of average per capita 
consumption, the headcount poverty rate, and the Gini-coefficient inequality measure 
from both the household survey and census at the level of the eight strata at which the 
household survey is representative.  Standard errors are presented for all estimates￿
reflecting the complex sample design of the household survey for the survey-based 
estimates, and our imputation procedure for the census based estimates (as described 
above).  In nearly every case, the estimates across the two data sources are within each 
other￿s 95 percent confidence interval.  In fact, it is striking how closely the point 
estimates match, particularly for the average consumption and headcount rates.  In the 
case of the inequality measure, we can see that the census estimates tend to be higher 
                                                 
12 For a similar analysis, focusing specifically on poverty, see Demombynes et al. (2002). 13 
than the survey-based estimates, although not generally to such an extent that one can 
reject that they are the same.  The propensity to produce higher estimates of inequality 
from the imputed census data arises from the fact that inequality measures tend to be 
sensitive to the tails in the distribution of expenditure.  Since the tails are typically not 
observed in the survey (because of its small size), the survey underestimates inequality. 
 
Table 2  Average expenditure, poverty, and inequality in Ecuador, by region (stratum) 














Quito  126,098 (11344)  0.25 (0.033)  0.490 (0.023)   125,702 (8026)  0.23 (0.024)  0.465 (0.012)
Urban Sierra  121,797 (8425)  0.19 (0.026)  0.436 (0.020)   122,415 (4642)  0.22 (0.017)  0.434 (0.011)
Rural Sierra  66,531 (4067)  0.43 (0.027)  0.393 (0.034)   63,666 (2213)  0.53 (0.019)  0.457 (0.013)
Guayaquil  89,601 (5597)  0.29 (0.027)  0.378 (0.014)   77,432 (2508)  0.38 (0.019)  0.416 (0.011)
Urban Costa  86,956 (3603)  0.25 (0.030)  0.359 (0.015)   90,209 (2391)  0.26 (0.015)  0.382 (0.011)
Rural Costa  57,617 (4477)  0.50 (0.042)  0.346 (0.036)   61,618 (2894)  0.50 (0.024)  0.400 (0.015)
Urban Oriente  110,064 (9078)  0.20 (0.050)  0.398 (0.035)   174,529 (56115)  0.19 (0.02)  0.563 (0.104)
Rural Oriente  47,072 (4420)  0.67 (0.054)  0.431 (0.034)   59,549 (3051)  0.59 (0.025)  0.478 (0.014)
 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present results analogous to those presented in Table 2 for 
Madagascar and Mozambique, respectively.  Again, the results indicate that at the 
stratum level there is little basis for rejecting equality of the survey- and census-based 
estimates of average per capita consumption, poverty, and inequality in the two countries.  
In Madagascar, standard errors on the survey estimates are quite high, indicating that 
while the household survey may be representative at the province and sector level, the 
sample size in these strata is rather small so that estimates are imprecise.  Nonetheless, 
for our purposes it is encouraging to note that point estimates across all three welfare 
indicators are often remarkably close.  In Mozambique, as in Ecuador (but less markedly 
so in Madagascar), inequality estimates tend to be higher than the survey estimates.  In 
some provinces, such as Sofala and Maputo Provinces, and Maputo City, the estimates 
are not only very high, but are also quite imprecisely estimated in the census.  Although 
these census-level standard errors are large, it is due primarily to model error.  As a  14 
Table 3  Average expenditure, poverty, and inequality in Madagascar, by province and 
sector 














Urban              
  Antananarivo  513,818 (48,455)  .544 (.048)  .492 (.027)    576,470 (23,944) .462 (.015)  .469 (.012) 
  Fianarantsoa  360,635 (42,613)  .674 (.059)  .430 (.038)    372,438 (21,878) .646 (.027)  .426 (.015) 
  Taomasina  445,514 (73,099)  .599 (.086)  .434 (.042)    417,823 (15,406) .599 (.018)  .402 (.015) 
  Mahajanga  613,867 (74,092)  .329 (.072)  .371 (.027)    580,775 (31,025) .378 (.028)  .392 (.016) 
  Toliara  343,111 (76,621)  .715 (.086)  .514 (.052)    321,602 (32,193) .713 (.036)  .504 (.030) 
  Antsiranana  504,841 (46,148)  .473 (.087)  .362 (.025)    693,161 (93,437) .344 (.031)  .433 (.039) 
Rural              
  Antananarivo  312,553 (23,174)  .767 (.037)  .376 (.023)    324,814 (14,378) .738 (.019)  .404 (.015) 
  Fianarantsoa  319,870 (45,215)  .769 (.049)  .470 (.050)    251,312 (18,091) .820 (.025)  .437 (.018) 
  Taomasina  275,943 (22,832)  .810 (.035)  .352 (.036)    279,239 (15,838) .786 (.026)  .362 (.017) 
  Mahajanga  325,872 (30,209)  .681 (.065)  .320 (.026)    321,398 (19,385) .695 (.039)  .306 (.015) 
  Toliara  233,801 (22,174)  .817 (.042)  .383 (.029)    259,537 (16,222) .800 (.027)  .377 (.017) 
  Antsiranana  486,781 (91,181)  .613 (.073)  .518 (.110)    442,431 (54,869) .581 (.046)  .453 (.048) 
Notes:  All figures based on a poverty line of 354,000 Malagasy francs per capita.  Household survey figures are 
calculated using weights that are the product of household survey weights and household size.  Census-based 
figures are calculated weighting by household size. 
 
 
Table 4  Average expenditure, poverty, and inequality in Mozambique, by province 














Niassa  4,660 (355)  0.71 (0.038)  0.355 (0.020)  5,512 (484)  0.67 (0.042)  0.402 (0.025)
Cabo Delgado  6,392 (416)  0.57 (0.042)  0.370 (0.025)  6,586 (433)  0.56 (0.036)  0.413 (0.021)
Nampula  5,315 (287)  0.69 (0.032)  0.391(0.026)  5,547 (279)  0.65 (0.024)  0.400 (0.020)
Zambezia  5,090 (208)  0.68 (0.026)  0.324 (0.017)  5,316 (274)  0.67 (0.029)  0.366 (0.012)
Tete  3,848 (267)  0.82 (0.032)  0.346 (0.019)  4,404 (176)  0.77 (0.016)  0.394 (0.018)
Manica  6,299 (741)  0.63 (0.059)  0.413 (0.036)  6,334 (527)  0.62 (0.044)  0.449 (0.020)
Sofala  3,218 (191)  0.88 (0.015)  0.405 (0.031)  4,497 (379)  0.78 (0.017)  0.529 (0.032)
Inhambane  4,215 (359)  0.83 (0.024)  0.382 (0.037)  4,177 (134)  0.81 (0.013)  0.398 (0.012)
Gaza  6,024 (356)  0.65 (0.033)  0.380 (0.024)  6,521 (355)  0.59 (0.021)  0.421 (0.023)
Maputo Province  5,844 (613)  0.66 (0.054)  0.424 (0.029)  8,559 (745)  0.55 (0.024)  0.518 (0.029)
Maputo City  8,321 (701)  0.48 (0.041)  0.444 (0.033)  11,442 (4956)  0.49 (0.047)  0.560 (0.108)
Notes:  All figures based on a poverty line of 5,433 meticais daily per capita.  Survey figures are calculated using 
weights that are the product of household survey weights and household size.  Census-based figures are 
calculated weighting by household size. 15 
result, and as we shall see below, there is no evidence that estimates become even more 
noisy at lower levels of aggregation. 
6.  Decomposing Inequality by Geographic Subgroups 
We turn in this section to the important question of how much of overall 
inequality in a given country is attributable to differences in average consumption across 
localities as opposed to inequality within localities.  It is clear that where national 
inequality is largely due to differences in mean income across regions, the policy 
implications are very different from the situation where subregions themselves are 
unequal and national inequality is simply an expression at the country level of a degree of 
heterogeneity that already exists at the more local level.  Decomposing inequality by 
subgroups enjoys a long tradition in the empirical analysis of inequality, in both 
developed and developing countries.  We decompose inequality using the General 
Entropy class of inequality measures, a class of measures that is particularly well-suited 
to this exercise.
13  This class of measures takes the following form: 
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where fi is the population share of household i, yi is per capita consumption of household 
i, µ is average per capita consumption, and c is a parameter that is to be selected by the 
                                                 
13 Following Bourguignon (1979), Shorrocks (1980), and Cowell (1980).  Cowell (2000) provides a useful 
recent survey of methods of inequality measurement, including a discussion of the various approaches to 
subgroup decomposition.  Sen and Foster (1997) and Kanbur (2000) discuss some of the difficulties in 
interpreting results from such decompositions. 16 
user.
14  This class of inequality measures can be decomposed into a between- and within-
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where j refers to subgroups, gj refers to the population share of group j, and Ij refers to 
inequality in group j.  The between-group component of inequality is captured by the first 
term to the right of the equality sign.  It can be interpreted as measuring what would be 
the level of inequality in the population if everyone within the group had the same (the 
group-average) consumption level µj.  The second term on the right reflects what would 
be the overall inequality level if there were no differences in mean consumption across 
groups but each group had its actual within-group inequality Ij.  Ratios of the respective 
components with the overall inequality level provide a measure of the percentage 
contribution of between-group and within-group inequality to total inequality. 
In Table 5 we examine how within-group inequality evolves at progressively 
lower levels of regional disaggregation in our three countries.  At one extreme, when a 
country-level perspective is taken, all inequality is, by definition, within-group.  At the 
other extreme, when each individual household is taken as a separate group, the within-
group contribution to overall inequality is zero.  But how rapidly does the within-group 
share fall?  Is it reasonable to suppose that at a sufficiently low level of disaggregation, 
such as the third administrative level in our three countries (with about 1,000-10,000 
                                                 
14 Lower values of c are associated with greater sensitivity to inequality among the poor, and higher values 
of c place more weight to inequality among the rich.  A c value of 1 yields the well-known Theil entropy 
measure, a value of 0 provides the Theil L or mean log deviation, and a value of 2 is ordinally equivalent to 
the squared coefficient of variation. 17 
households), differences within groups are small, and most of overall inequality is due to 
differences between groups? 
 
Table 5  Decomposition of inequality, by regional subgroup (GE0) 
Level of decomposition  Number of subgroups  Within-group (%)  Between-group (%) 
Ecuador      
  Rural       
    National    1    100    0 
    Region    3    100    0 
    Province    21    98.7    1.3 
    Canton    195    94.1    5.9 
    Parroquia    915    85.9    14.1 
    Household    960,529    0    100 
  Urban       
    National    1    100    0 
    Region
a   5    100    6.6 
    Province
a  19    98.7    7.3 
    Canton
a   87    94.1    8.6 
    Zonas    664    85.9    23.3 
    Household    880,001    0    100 
Madagascar      
  Urban    1    100    0 
    Faritany    6    92.3    7.7 
    Fivondrona    103    78.3    21.7 
    Firaisana    131    76.7    23.2 
  Rural    1    100    0 
    Faritany    6    95.2    4.8 
    Fivondrona    104    84.6    15.4 
    Firaisana    1,117    81.9    18.1 
Mozambique      
  National    1    100    0 
  Province    11    90.7    9.3 
  District    146    81.6    18.4 
  Administrative Post    424    78.0    22.0 
a Quito and Guayaquil are treated as independent geographic areas. 
 
We decompose inequality in our three countries on the basis of the GE(0) 
measure.
15  In rural Ecuador we see that when we have disaggregated down to the level of 
915 parroquias (with an average number of households of a little over 1,000), some 86 
percent of overall inequality remains within-group.  In urban areas of Ecuador, the within-
group share, across 664 urban zonas (with 1,300 households, on average), is only slightly 
lower at 77 percent. 
                                                 
15 Results remain virtually identical for other values of c. 18 
The same pattern obtains in Madagascar and Mozambique (Table 5).  In all three 
countries no less than three quarters of all inequality is attributable to within-community 
differences, even after one has disaggregated down to a very low level (corresponding, in 
our countries, to the lowest level of central government administration).  At first glance, one 
might understand these results as suggesting that even within local communities, there exists 
a considerable heterogeneity of living standards.  Such a conclusion might have implications 
regarding the likelihood of political capture, the feasibility of raising revenues locally, and 
the extent to which residents in these localities can be viewed as having similar demands 
and priorities. 
However, a blanket statement about the degree of inequality within communities 
does not follow directly from the above decomposition results.  It is important to recognize 
that the decomposition exercise indicates that, on average, inequality does not fall much 
with aggregation level.  In other words, it is very well possible that at low levels of 
aggregation, the population is characterized by both highly equal and highly unequal 
communities.  A simple example can illustrate this.  Consider a population of eight 
individuals with consumption values (1,1,2,2,4,4,5,5).  This population could be divided 
into two communities as (1,2,4,5) and (1,2,4,5); or as (1,1,5,5) and (2,2,4,4).  In both 
cases the two communities have the same average consumption.  As a result the between-
group component from the decomposition exercise is always zero (and thus the within-
group share is 100 percent in both cases).  However, in the first case, inequality in the 
two communities is exactly equal to national inequality, whereas in the second case one 
community has higher and the other lower inequality than at the national level.  As can be 
readily seen from the expressions for decomposing the General Entropy class of 
inequality measures provided above, when average consumption levels are the same for 
all communities, overall inequality is calculated by taking a population-weighted average 
of community-level inequality rates.  Finding a high within-group share from a 
decomposition exercise across a large number of communities is thus perfectly consistent 
with great heterogeneity in inequality levels across communities. 19 
In a situation, such as ours, where the decomposition exercise is carried out across a 
very large number of communities, it is important to check for variation in the degree of 
inequality across communities.  Are all communities as unequal as the country as a whole?  
Such a finding would certainly generate a large within-group contribution in a 
decomposition exercise.  Or do communities vary widely in their degree of inequality?  That 
could also yield a high within-group share.  In Figures 1-5, we plot community-level 
inequality estimates and compare these against national-level inequality.  Communities are 
ranked from most equal to most unequal, and 95 percent confidence intervals on each 
community-level estimate are included as scatter plots.  Figure 1 compares parroquia level 
inequality in rural Ecuador against the overall inequality level in rural areas.  We see that 
although the within-group share from the decomposition exercise was as high as 86 percent, 
this summary statistic masks considerable variation in parroquia inequality levels.  A large 
majority of parroquia-level point estimates are well below the national level in rural 
Ecuador.  Even allowing for the imprecision around the parroquia-level estimates (which 
are typically 5-15 percent of the point estimate), a sizeable proportion of parroquias are 
unambiguously more equal than the picture at the national level.  Another sizeable 
proportion is not obviously less or more unequal than the country as a whole, and a small 
number of parroquias are considerably more unequal.
16  In urban Ecuador (Figure 2), the 
proportion of zonas that have lower inequality than the national-level inequality rate is even 
higher than in rural areas.  The precision of point estimates in urban areas of Ecuador is 
                                                 
16 Note the reason that there are more communities with inequality below the national level than above the 
national level is due to the fact that between-group inequality, while relatively small, is not absent.   
Differences in average per capita consumption ensure that at least some of total inequality is attributable to 
differences between groups.  If there were no within-group inequality at all, or if all communities had the 
same level of within-group inequality (in the example above, suppose the eight person population were 
divided into two groups of four persons one with incomes 1,1,2,2, and the other with incomes 4,4,5,5) then 
total, national inequality would be higher than inequality in all of the individual communities (equal in the 
example to the common within-group inequality plus that attributable to the difference between the two 
groups). 20 




Figure 2  Distribution across zonas of zona-level inequality, urban Ecuador: GE(0) 
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somewhat higher than in rural areas; accordingly, more zonas lie unambiguously below the 
national inequality level. 
In rural and urban Madagascar (Figures 3 and 4) and in Mozambique (Figure 5) 
the picture is very similar.  In all of the countries considered in this study, there is a clear 
and sizeable subset of communities with lower inequality than the country as a whole; 
another large group for which inequality is not significantly different from inequality in 
the country as a whole; and a small third group of communities with inequality higher 
than the national level. 
7.  Correlates of Local Inequality:  Does Geography Matter? 
We have found empirical support for both the view that at the local level, 
communities are more homogeneous than society as a whole, and the view that local 
communities are as heterogeneous as society as a whole.  The question then arises as to  
Figure 3  Distribution across firaisanas of firaisana-level inequality, rural Madagascar: GE(0) 
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Figure 5  Distribution across administrative posts of post-level inequality, Mozambique: 
GE(0) 
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whether it is possible to readily distinguish between communities on the basis of some 
simple indicators.  In particular, we are interested to know whether there are discernable 
geographic patterns of inequality. 
In Tables 6a-6e, we provide results from OLS regressions of inequality on a set of 
simple community characteristics.  We ask whether inequality levels are correlated with 
location, controlling for both demographic characteristics of the communities (population 
size and demographic composition), and mean per capita consumption.  Table 6a for rural 
Ecuador finds strong evidence that inequality in the parroquias of the eastern, Oriente, 
region is significantly higher than the province of Pichincha in the central, mountainous, 
Sierra, region.  Communities located in provinces in the western, coastal, Costa, region tend 
to be more equal, significantly so in the provinces of Manabi, Los Rios, Guayas, and El Oro.  
Relatively few differences are discernable across provinces within the Sierra region.
17  
Understanding these geographic patterns of inequality is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
the evidence is consistent with historical and anecdotal accounts of a very divergent 
evolution of society and economic structures in the mountainous Sierra vis-￿-vis the Costa 
and Oriente.
18  In rural Ecuador, there is evidence that larger parroquias tend to be more 
unequal.  An interesting finding is that parroquias with a larger proportion of elderly, 
relative to the population share of 20-40-year olds, are more unequal.  This pattern is 
consistent with the findings of Deaton and Paxson (1995) regarding the positive association 
between an aging population and inequality.  The quantitative importance and statistical 
significance of both geographic and demographic characteristics remains broadly unchanged 
when mean per capita consumption (and its square) are added to the model.  In rural 
Ecuador, inequality is positively associated with higher consumption levels.  While there is 
some suggestion of a turning point (at around $2,800 per capita per month)￿the 
                                                 
17 We can reject with 95 percent confidence, for both rural and urban Ecuador, the null hypothesis that 
parameter estimates on province dummies within their respective regions are all equal. 
18 See, for example, ￿Under the Volcano,￿ The Economist, November 27, 1999, p. 66. 24 
Table 6a  Correlates of mean Log deviation (GE0) in rural Ecuador 
Parroquia-level regression (915 parroquias) 
  Basic regression  + expenditure 
Log population  0.0169 (0.002)***  0.010 (0.002)*** 
Percent aged 0-10  -0.139 (0.079)*  0.321 (0.080)*** 
Percent aged 10-20  -0.375 (0.104)***  -0.084 (0.096) 
Percent aged 40-60  -0.246 (0.130)*  0.053 (0.120) 
Percent aged 61+  0.269 (0.123)***  0.392 (0.112)*** 
Log mean per capita expenditure    0.222 (0.085)*** 
(Log mean per capita expenditure)
2   -0.014  (0.010) 
Oriente    
  Sucumbios  0.036 (0.013)***  0.036 (0.012)*** 
  Napo  0.051 (0.012)***  0.056 (0.011)*** 
  Pastaza     0.071 (0.015)*** 0.077  (0.013)*** 
  Morona_Santiago  0.040 (0.011)***  0.036 (0.010)*** 
  Zamora_Chinchipe    0.034 (0.013)**  0.037 (0.012)*** 
Costa    
  Esmeraldas  -0.012 (0.010)  -0.036 (0.010)*** 
  Manabi  -0.060 (0.010)***  -0.057 (0.009)*** 
  Los Rios  -0.041 (0.013)***  -0.025 (0.012)** 
  Guayas  -0.050 (0.010)***  -0.035 (0.009)*** 
  El Oro  -0.022 (0.010)**  -0.020 (0.009)** 
  GalÆpagos  0.027 (0.023 )  -0.000 (0.021) 
Sierra    
  Carchi  -0.002 (0.012)  0.014 (0.010) 
  Imbabura  0.024 (0.010)**  0.037 (0.011)*** 
  Cotopaxi  -0.013 (0.011)  -0.001 (0.010) 
  Tungurahua  -0.025 (0.010)**  -0.010 (0.009) 
  Bolivar  -0.0002 (0.012)  0.002 (0.011) 
  Chimborazo  -0.010 (0.010)  0.006 (0.010) 
  Canar  0.003 (0.012)  0.007 (0.011) 
  Azuay  0.011 (0.010)  0.014 (0.009) 
  Loja  0.024 (0.009)**  0.036 (0.008)*** 
Constant 0.296  (0.060)  -0.571  (0.192) 
Observations 915  915 
R-squared 0.24  0.38 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent. *** significant at 1 
percent.  Excluded groups are Pichincha and percent population age 20-40. 
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well-known ￿inverted U-curve￿￿the statistical support for this is weak.  The correlation 
between inequality and the population share of young children, relative to 20-40-year olds, 
switches in sign from negative to positive, depending on whether per capita consumption is 
included in the specification.  It seems clear that the share of young children is likely to be 
(negatively) correlated with per capita consumption so that the coefficient on this variable is 
capturing the consumption effect, when average expenditures are excluded from the 
specification.  Once consumption expenditures are controlled for, the correlation between 
inequality and the share of children in the population becomes positive.  Possibly there 
exists greater heterogeneity in household size in those parroquias with large population 
shares of young children and that this translates into greater inequality of per capita 
consumption. 
In urban Ecuador (Table 6b) the relatively low inequality in the Costa region is again 
observed.  Relative to the zonas in the capital Quito, inequality in all zonas of the Costa 
region tends to be significantly lower.  Other urban areas in the Sierra are again not 
noticeably less or more equal than Quito.  In urban areas, in contrast to rural areas, 
population size of the zona does not appear to be significantly correlated with its inequality 
level.
19  Also in contrast to rural areas, conditioning on mean consumption levels does not 
add much explanatory power:  there is no evidence that poorer zonas are also more equal.  
Zonas with large dependency ratios (irrespective of whether these are due to many young 
children or of a large proportion of elderly) are associated with higher inequality levels, 
irrespective of controlling for consumption. 
Tables 6c and 6d provide analogous results for Madagascar.  The broad conclusions 
are quite similar to those found in Ecuador.  As in rural Ecuador, in rural Madagascar 
population size is positively associated with inequality, and the larger the percentage of 
elderly in the firaisana, the more unequal the community.  As in Ecuador, inequality rises 
with mean consumption (in the Madagascar case the inverted U curve is more clearly 
                                                 
19 Although zonas vary less in population size than parroquias, they still range between 800-1,900 
households. 26 
Table 6b  Correlates of mean Log deviation (GE0) in urban Ecuador 
Zona-level regression (660 zonas) 
  Basic regression  + expenditure 
Log population  -0.013 (0.015)  -0.003 (0.014) 
Percent aged 0-10  0.231 (0.118)*  0.253 (0.119)** 
Percent aged 10-20  0.283 (0.098)***  0.791 (0.112)*** 
Percent aged 40-60  0.001 (0.141)  -0.673 (0.162)*** 
Percent aged 61+  0.704 (0.162)***  1.084 (0.161)*** 
Log mean per capita expenditure    0.025 (0.075) 
(Log mean per capita expenditure)
2   0.005  (0.008) 
Oriente    
  Pastaza  0.052 (0.033)  0.049 (0.031) 
  Morona_Santiago  0.457 (0.046)***  0.381 (0.045)*** 
  Zamora_Chinchipe    0.031 (0.046)  0.004 (0.044) 
Costa    
  Esmeraldas  -0.073 (0.013)***  -0.066 (0.012)*** 
  Manabi  -0.084 (0.007)***  -0.069 (0.007)*** 
  Los Rios  -0.077 (0.010)***  -0.049 (0.011)*** 
  Guayas  -0.097 (0.008)***  -0.064 (0.008)*** 
  El Oro  -0.094 (0.009)***  -0.081 (0.009)*** 
  Guayaquil  -0.087 (0.005 )***  -0.054 (0.007)*** 
Sierra    
  Carchi  -0.009 (0.017)  0.012 (0.017) 
  Imbabura  0.022 (0.014)  -0.008 (0.013) 
  Cotopaxi  0.007 (0.016)  0.006 (0.015) 
  Tungurahua  -0.008 (0.014)  -0.003 (0.013) 
  Pichincha  -0.011 (0.010)  -0.000 (0.010) 
  Chimborazo  -0.025 (0.015)*  -0.026 (0.014)* 
  Canar  -0.012 (0.024)  -0.018 (0.022) 
  Azuay  -0.013 (0.010)  -0.018 (0.010)* 
  Loja  -0.003 (0.013)  -0.010 (0.012) 
Constant 0.272  (0.140)  -0.076  (0.242) 
Observations 660  660 
R-squared 0.52  0.57 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent. *** significant at 1 




Table 6c  Correlates of mean Log deviation (GE0) in rural Madagascar 
Firaisana-level regression (1,117 firaisanas) 
  Basic regression  + expenditure 
Log population  0.010 (0.002)***  0.012 (0.002)*** 
Percent aged 0-5  -0.768 (0.085)***  -0.700 (0.086)*** 
Percent aged 6-11  -0.226 (0.127)*  -0.091 (0.126) 
Percent aged 12-14  0.193 (0.241)  0.236 (0.242) 
Percent aged 50-59  -1.757 (0.292)***  -1.747 (0.286)*** 
Percent aged 60+  0.462 (0.152)**  0.696 (0.152)*** 
Log mean per capita expenditure    0.886 (0.118)*** 
(Log mean per capita expenditure)
2   -0.034  (0.005)*** 
Provinces    
  Antananarivo  -0.068 (0.006)***  -0.065 (0.006)*** 
  Fianarantsoa  0.011 (0.005)**  0.020 (0.006)*** 
  Toamasina    -0.059 (0.006)***  -0.054 (0.006)*** 
  Mahajanga  -0.115 (0.006)***  -0.116 (0.006)*** 
  Toliara  -0.046 (0.005)***  -0.042 (0.006)*** 
Constant 0.430  (0.041)***  -5.356  (0.765)*** 
Observations 1,117  1,117 
R-squared 0.53  0.55 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent.  Excluded groups are Antsiranana and percent population age 15-49. 
 
discernable) and geography is strongly and independently significant.  Relative to the 
population share aged 15-50, the higher the share of children and the share of population 
aged 50-59, the more equal the community, whether or not one controls for consumption.  In 
Madagascar, it seems that communities with large population shares of children are not 
markedly more heterogeneous in household size.  For rural Madagascar, the simple 
specification employed here yields an R
2 as high as 0.55 when all variables are included. 
In urban Madagascar, the explanatory power is even greater (Table 6d).  Here, 
unlike rural areas, population size is significantly negatively associated with inequality.  As 
in rural areas, the larger the percentage of children, the lower is inequality.  As in urban 
Ecuador, mean per capita consumption is not significantly associated with inequality￿there 
is no presumption that a poorer urban firaisana is more homogeneous than a rich one.  
Geographic variables remain independently significant, with urban areas in Antananarivo 28 
Table 6d  Correlates of mean Log deviation (GE0) in urban Madagascar 
Firaisana-level regression (131 firaisanas) 
  Basic regression  + expenditure 
Log population  -0.014 (0.005)***  -0.011 (0.005)** 
Percent aged 0-5  -1.253 (0.202)***  -1.053 (0.243)*** 
Percent aged 6-11  0.166 (0.464)  0.147 (0.465) 
Percent aged 12-14  -0.965 (0.777)  -0.551 (0.826) 
Percent aged 50-59  -2.602 (0.882)***  -2.543 (0.882)*** 
Percent aged 60+  1.183 (0.396)***  1.355 (0.417)*** 
Log mean per capita expenditure    0.117 (0.143) 
(Log mean per capita expenditure)
2   -0.004  (0.013) 
Provinces    
  Antananarivo  0.079 (0.015)***  0.080 (0.015)*** 
  Fianarantsoa     0.059 (0.014)***  0.065 (0.015)*** 
  Toamasina    -0.012 (0.014)  -0.007 (0.015) 
  Mahajanga  -0.025 (0.014)*  -0.027 (0.014)* 
  Toliara  0.117 (0.013)***  0.125 (0.014)*** 
Constant 0.717  (0.106)  -0.270  (2.245) 
Observations 131  131 
R-squared 0.78  0.79 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent.  Excluded groups are Antsiranana and and population age 15-49. 
 
(the capital province), Fianarantsoa, and Toliara more unequal than the urban areas in the 
rest of the country. 
Table 6e confirms that in Mozambique, too, geographic variables are key 
indicators of local-level inequality, controlling for population characteristics, mean 
expenditure levels, and urban/rural differences.  Compared with Maputo City, the rest of 
the country has significantly less inequality.  There is more inequality in urban areas, an 
increasing association with mean consumption (but no Kuznets curve), and areas with a 
higher percentage of 17-30-year-olds seem to have higher inequality. 
We have not attempted here to identify the best possible set of correlates of local 
inequality for each of the three countries we are examining.  We have chosen to employ a 
parsimonious, and broadly similar, specification in the three countries in order to ask 
whether there are any common patterns across countries that in other respects resemble 29 
Table 6e  Correlates of mean Log deviation (GE0) in Mozambique 
Administrative post-level regression (464 administrative posts) 
  Basic regression  + expenditure  + urban 
Percent aged 0-5  -0.002 (0.004)  0.000 (0.003)  0.001 (0.003) 
Percent aged 6-10  0.017 (0.005)**  0.015 (0.004)**  0.014 (0.004)** 
Percent females aged 11-16  0.027 (0.009)**  0.020 (0.008)**  0.015 (0.008) 
Percent males aged 11-16  -0.000 (0.009)  0.001 (0.008)  0.002 (0.008) 
Percent females aged 17-30  0.016** (0.004)  0.012 (0.003)**  0.011 (0.003)** 
Percent males aged 17-30  0.015 (0.005)**  0.010 (0.004)*  0.009 (0.004)* 
Percent females aged 31-60  0.005 (0.006)  0.005 (0.006)  0.007 (0.006) 
Percent males aged 31-60  0.007 (0.004)  0.005 (0.004)  0.004 (0.004) 
Log (population of posto)  0.001 (0.004)  -0.003 (0.003)  -0.005 (0.004) 
Niassa  -0.200 (0.036)**  -0.138 (0.034)**  -0.136 (0.033)** 
Cabo Delgado  -0.204 (0.034)**  -0.163 (0.031)**  -0.158 (0.031)** 
Nampula  -0.204 (0.035)**  -0.143 (0.032)**  -0.143 (0.032)** 
ZambØzia  -0.215 (0.035)**  -0.154 (0.032)**  -0.149 (0.032)** 
Tete  -0.212 (0.036)**  -0.133 (0.033)**  -0.127 (0.033)** 
Manica  -0.135 (0.035)**  -0.095 (0.032)**  -0.089 (0.032)** 
Sofala  -0.118 (0.035)**  -0.005 (0.032)  -0.006 (0.032) 
Inhambane  -0.178 (0.035)**  -0.088 (0.032)**  -0.090 (0.032)** 
Gaza -0.189  (0.035)**  -0.136  (0.032)** -0.135 (0.031)** 
Maputo Province  -0.088 (0.036)*  -0.045 (0.032)  -0.044 (0.032) 
Log (mean expenditure)    -0.406 (0.216)  -0.324 (0.217) 
[Log (mean expenditure)]squared    0.031 (0.013)*  0.025 (0.013)* 
Urban     0.037  (0.014)** 
Constant  -0.504 (0.321)  0.856 (0.962)  0.605 (0.960) 
Observations 424  424  424 
R-squared 0.465  0.595  0.601 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.  Excluded groups are 
Maputo city and percent persons older than 60 years. 
 
each other very little (particularly the comparison between Ecuador and the two Sub-
Saharan African countries).  We have indeed found that in all three countries we 
consider, in both rural and urban areas, geographic location is a good predictor of local-
level inequality, even after controlling for some basic demographic and economic 
characteristics of the communities.  With respect to other characteristics, there appear to 
be clear differences between urban and rural areas (best seen in the models for Ecuador 30 
and Madagascar).  In rural areas, inequality tends to be higher in communities with larger 
populations, a higher share of the elderly in the total population, and in communities with 
higher mean consumption levels.  In urban areas, mean consumption is not independently 
correlated with inequality, and inequality is not typically higher in communities with 
larger populations.  High population shares of elderly are clearly associated with higher 
inequality, but the correlation with population shares of children depends on the country. 
8.  Conclusions 
This paper has taken three developing countries, Ecuador, Madagascar, and 
Mozambique, and has implemented in each a methodology to produce disaggregated 
estimates of inequality.  The countries are very unlike each other￿with different 
geographies, stages of development, quality and types of data, and so on.  The 
methodology works well in all three settings and produces valuable information about the 
spatial distribution of poverty and inequality within those countries￿information that 
was previously not available. 
The methodology is based on a statistical procedure to combine household survey 
data with population census data, by imputing into the latter a measure of economic 
welfare (consumption expenditure in our examples) from the former.  Like the usual 
sample-based estimates, the inequality measures produced are also estimates and subject 
to statistical error.  The paper has demonstrated that the mean consumption, poverty, and 
inequality estimates produced from census data match well the estimates calculated 
directly from the country￿s surveys (at levels of disaggregation that the survey can bear).  
The precision of the inequality estimates produced with this methodology depends on the 
degree of disaggregation.  In all three countries considered here, our inequality estimators 
allow one to work at a level of disaggregation far below that allowed by surveys. 
We have decomposed inequality in our three countries into progressively more 
disaggregated spatial units, and have shown that even at a very high level of spatial 
disaggregation, the contribution to overall inequality of within-community inequality is 31 
very high (75 percent or more).  We have argued that such a high within-group 
component does not necessarily imply that there are no between-group differences at all 
and that all communities in a given country are as unequal as the country as a whole.  We 
have shown that in all three countries, there is a considerable amount of variation in 
inequality across communities.  Many communities are rather more equal than their 
respective country as a whole, but there are also many communities that are not clearly 
more homogeneous than society as a whole, and may even be considerably more unequal. 
We have explored some basic correlates of local-level inequality in our three 
countries.  We have found consistent patterns across all three countries.  Geographic 
characteristics are strongly correlated with inequality, even after controlling for 
demographic and economic conditions.  The correlation with geography is observed in 
both rural and urban areas.  In rural areas, population size and mean consumption at the 
community level are positively associated with inequality, while in urban areas that is not 
the case.  In both rural and urban areas, populations with large shares of the elderly tend 
to be more unequal.  In Madagascar, populations with large shares of children and large 
shares of individuals aged 50-59 are consistently more equal.  In Ecuador, this is true 
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